Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 103 | Issue 2

Article 5

Spring 2013

Walking Firearms to Gunrunners: ATF’s Flawed
Operation in a Flawed System
Michael Krantz

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Michael Krantz, Walking Firearms to Gunrunners: ATF’s Flawed Operation in a Flawed System, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 585
(2013).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol103/iss2/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091-4169/13/10302-0585
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 2013 by Northwestern University School of Law

Vol. 103, No. 2
Printed in U.S.A.

COMMENTS
WALKING FIREARMS TO GUNRUNNERS:
ATF’S FLAWED OPERATION
IN A FLAWED SYSTEM
Michael Krantz *
On December 14, 2010, Customs and Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry
was shot and killed in a gun battle near the United States–Mexico border. 1
Near the scene, investigators found two AK-47 assault rifles, 2 regular tools
of the trade for Mexican drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs). Over time,
Congress discovered that these weapons were part of the elaborate
Operation Fast and Furious, conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF). 3
*
J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2013. I would like to thank my former
colleagues at the Department of Justice, Valinda Jones and Christopher Dana among others,
for helping to develop this Comment and fueling my interest in issues facing international
criminal law enforcement. Thank you also to my family for their eternal support.
1
James V. Grimaldi & Sari Horwitz, ATF Probe Strategy Is Questioned, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 2011, at A4.
2
Id.
3
Id. ATF’s website describes the agency as a “law enforcement agency in the United
States Department of Justice that protects our communities from violent criminals, criminal
organizations, the illegal use and trafficking of firearms, the illegal use and storage of
explosives, acts of arson and bombings, acts of terrorism, and the illegal diversion of alcohol
and tobacco products.” See About ATF: Our Mission, ATF, http://www.atf.gov/about/ (last
visited Apr. 16, 2013). ATF is also tasked with upholding the licensing scheme for the
national firearms market.
Firearms Enforcement, ATF, http://www.atf.gov/content/
Firearms/firearms-enforcement (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). The agency began as an arm of
the Treasury Department tasked with collecting taxes on imported and domestic spirits, and
its predecessors played a role in the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. History of ATF from
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It is standard procedure for ATF agents to track high-powered
firearms, which are sometimes illegally purchased by straw purchasers,4 to
determine the flow of illegal weapons. Procedure also dictates that agents
interdict these weapons when possible to prevent them from ending up on
the black market. 5 According to documents and testimony before Congress,
however, the Fast and Furious agents allowed the weapons to “walk” into
the hands of drug cartel members certain to use the weapons for harming
others. 6 Agents hoped that they could ultimately follow the weapons to
leadership in the Mexican drug cartels, thus connecting illicit U.S. weapons
purchases to the cartels.7 The agents could then build cases against specific
cartel leaders.8 Contrary to the plan, ATF lost track of the weapons, and
Mexican law enforcement subsequently found some at crime scenes of
gruesome violence in Mexico. Once called to their attention, U.S.
lawmakers immediately questioned the extremely risky operation that
allowed weapons to be transported to dangerous Mexican cartels, putting
both Mexican and American lives at risk. 9 Most recently the Office of the
Inspector General in the U.S. Department of Justice issued a report
Oxford University Press, Inc.—1789–1998, ATF, http://www.atf.gov/about/history/atf-from1789-1998.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
4
A straw purchaser is a buyer who may legally purchase a weapon for his own purposes
but who is in reality purchasing the weapon for another person who may not legally purchase
or possess the firearm under U.S. law. JOINT STAFFS OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T
REFORM & S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 112TH CONG., THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S
OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS: ACCOUNTS OF ATF AGENTS 4 (2011) [hereinafter ACCOUNTS
OF ATF AGENTS]. The straw purchaser has a legal right to purchase the weapon for himself,
but this transaction is technically illegal because a buyer is not allowed to purchase a weapon
for another person who is not himself legally permitted to purchase or possess the weapon.
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1)–(9) (2006). This includes a prohibition on selling weapons to a
purchaser who is not a U.S. citizen, or at least who is unlawfully in the United States. Id.
§ 922(d)(5).
5
ACCOUNTS OF ATF AGENTS, supra note 4, at 12.
6
Agents “walk” guns when they choose to let the weapons pass into the hands of a
person barred from possessing the weapons by the federal criminal code rather than interdict
them. Grimaldi & Horwitz, supra note 1; see also James V. Grimaldi, ATF Faces Federal
Review over Tactics to Foil Gunrunning Rings, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2011, at A4.
7
See infra notes 149–153 and accompanying text.
8
See infra notes 149–153 and accompanying text.
9
As a result of the scandal and the subsequent congressional investigations, the U.S.
Attorney for the District of Arizona, who tacitly approved the operation, resigned, and the
Acting Chief of ATF in Washington, D.C., was reassigned to another position. See Evan
Perez & Devlin Barrett, Two Fall in Gun Scandal: Management Shake-Up Follows Troubled
Operation Targeting Weapon Trafficking, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2011, at A3. Attorney
General Eric Holder has also been the subject of significant congressional scrutiny for his
tangential knowledge of the operation; the House of Representatives even held him in
contempt for allegedly withholding pertinent documents. Richard A. Serrano, House Finds
Atty. Gen. Eric Holder in Contempt of Congress, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/28/nation/la-na-holder-contempt-20120629.
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determining that the Department of Justice did not carefully oversee the
operations conducted by the ATF and failed to provide completely accurate
information during the scandal’s aftermath. 10
Every day United States law enforcement faces an uphill battle in its
efforts to control the trafficking of weapons throughout the United States
and across the southern border into Mexico. 11 In 2006, Mexican President
Felipe Calderón launched a war against the Mexican drug cartels, deploying
military regiments to crime-ridden areas, increasing arrests and
prosecutions of traffickers, and extraditing more traffickers to face charges
in the United States. 12 The Mexican cartels responded to the declaration of
war by ramping up violence across Mexico. 13 The violence in Mexico has
been largely indiscriminate, with cartels targeting Mexican law
enforcement, rival cartels, and innocent civilians, all in an effort to control
the drug routes into the United States and to intimidate opponents into
submission. 14
Mexican weapons laws are far more stringent than those in the United
States. The Mexican Constitution contains a provision similar to the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution espousing a right to
bear arms, 15 but the Mexican Constitution also restricts possession of many
high-powered weapons for citizens who are not members of the military or
law enforcement. 16 Article Ten of the Constitution of the United Mexican
10
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF ATF’S
OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS AND RELATED MATTERS 397–99 (2012) (alleging that high
officials in the Department of Justice failed to accurately research the scandal and relied
instead on lower ranking officials for information that turned out to be inaccurate).
11
This Comment will focus exclusively on the unique challenges facing U.S. law
enforcement regarding international weapons trafficking—namely, when weapons are
purchased in the United States and smuggled across the border into Mexico. Issues with
illegal weapons trafficking from states in the United States with lenient gun-control laws,
such as those in the south and southwest, to states and cities with stronger prohibitions on
weapons, such as Washington, D.C., or Chicago, are the subject of other scholarship. See,
e.g., MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, THE MOVEMENT OF ILLEGAL GUNS IN AMERICA: THE
LINK BETWEEN GUN LAWS AND INTERSTATE GUN TRAFFICKING 2 (2008) (examining “the
relationship between a state’s gun regulations and the likelihood that it will be a source of
guns recovered in out-of-state crimes”).
12
THE BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, EXPORTING GUN VIOLENCE: HOW OUR
WEAK GUN LAWS ARM CRIMINALS IN MEXICO AND AMERICA 8 (2009).
13
Id. (explaining that most violence occurs along the border and along drug-trafficking
corridors—paths into the United States through which the cartels traffic illegal narcotics).
14
See id.; Evan Perez, Mexican Guns Tied to U.S., WALL ST. J., Jun. 10, 2011, at A3.
15
The text of the Second Amendment reads, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. For a brief discussion of the Second Amendment right
pertaining to this Comment, see infra Part IV.C.
16
The United States Consulate General in Tijuana, Mexico, counsels United States
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States declares:
The people of the United Mexican States have the right to possess weapons in their
homes, for their security and legitimate defense, with the exception of those
prohibited by federal law and those reserved for the exclusive use of the Army, Navy,
Air Force, and National Guard. Federal law will determine the cases, conditions,
17
requirements and places in which the carrying of firearms shall be authorized.

Mexico’s Federal Law of Firearms and Explosives determines which
high-powered weapons individual citizens may not possess.18 As a result,
most of the high-powered weapons employed by the Mexican cartels, such
as AK-47 assault rifles and Barrett .50-caliber sniper rifles, are not
manufactured or legally sold in Mexico and must instead come from outside
of Mexico via illicit trafficking. The weapons usually come from the
United States.
Cartels use an elaborate and diffuse web of straw purchasers and
transactions in order to avoid detection as they smuggle firearms south into
Mexico. 19 Cartels hire buyers to purchase a few weapons at a time and
those weapons may then pass through four or five additional middlemen to
throw U.S. authorities off track. 20 This process of passing firearms from a
legal primary market into an illegal secondary market is known as weapons
trafficking. 21 Once a weapon is swallowed into the secondary market, it is
easy to smuggle across the U.S. border with Mexico.
A 2009 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office
estimated that 90% of traceable weapons recovered in Mexico between
citizens not to bring guns or knives into Mexico due to Mexico’s strict gun laws. See Guns
Are Illegal in Mexico, CONSULATE GEN. OF THE U.S., http://tijuana.usconsulate.gov/tijuana/
warning.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
17
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, as amended, tit. I, art. X,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
18
Restricted weapons include any fully automatic weapons, some semiautomatic
handguns, rifles larger than .30 caliber, and revolvers .357 caliber and up. See Ley Federal
de Armas de Fuego y Explosivos [Federal Law of Firearms and Explosives], as amended,
tit. I, art. 11, D.O., 11 de Enero de 1972 (Mex.).
19
See, e.g., Evan Perez, An American Gun in Mexico: How Does a Weapon Made in
Tennessee, Sold in Missouri and Traded in Texas End up at a Drug Shootout in Chihuahua?,
WALL ST. J., May 21, 2011, at C1 (reporting that straw purchasers may “for a few hundred
dollars, buy firearms on behalf of others who can’t pass background checks or who don’t
want records of their purchases”).
20
Id.
21
18 U.S.C. § 554 (2006) prohibits the act of fraudulently or knowingly exporting any
object contrary to any U.S. law or regulation. This includes smuggling weapons out of the
United States, which is distinct from trafficking weapons. Smuggling is a problem that
implicates greater border control (and resulting coordination) on both sides, whereas
trafficking, i.e., preventing weapons from disappearing into an illegal market, is a problem
solely for U.S. law enforcement, where improvement can directly alleviate the weaponssmuggling problem.
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2006 and 2008 came from the United States. 22 This number could be taken
out of context because 90% of total traceable weapons is a significantly
smaller number than the total number of weapons actually recovered. 23
When viewed as a fraction of the total number of weapons recovered, the
percentage affirmatively traced to the United States is thus much lower.
This quantity, however, is also underinclusive since it does not include
weapons manufactured abroad and then smuggled into Mexico through the
United States. 24 The numbers unequivocally show, however, that the flow
of weapons from the United States plays a large role in the weaponry
amassed by Mexican drug cartels. 25 Preventing weapons trafficking along
the border would undoubtedly alleviate some of the violence in the area.
Recent budget cuts have left ATF understaffed along the border and
unable to grapple adequately with the enormous problem of weapons
trafficking. 26 Moreover, ATF has difficulty recruiting personnel for
dangerous operations in Mexico and in southwestern border states. 27
Although the number of special agents working gunrunning cases along the
22

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-709, FIREARMS TRAFFICKING: U.S.
EFFORTS TO COMBAT ARMS TRAFFICKING TO MEXICO FACE PLANNING AND COORDINATION
CHALLENGES 15 (2009) [hereinafter GAO FIREARMS TRAFFICKING REPORT].
23
For example, in 2008, approximately 30,000 weapons were seized by Mexican law
enforcement, but only 7,200 were subsequently traced by ATF. See id. at 16. In 2009,
21,313 guns were submitted for tracing and 10,945 (51.35%) were manufactured in the
United States. Perez, supra note 14, at A3.
24
For example, ATF determined that of 7,971 firearms recovered in Mexico in 2010 and
traced by ATF, 4,186 were manufactured in the United States and 2,105 were imported into
the United States. Perez, supra note 14, at A3. The origin of 1,680 firearms is unknown. Id.
The origin of the untraceable weapons is thus a matter of dispute, but it seems most likely
that they would also be from the United States, which is “[c]onsistent with . . . [anecdotal
reports by] U.S. law enforcement officials who had worked on arms trafficking in
Mexico . . . that most of the firearms in Mexico had originated in the United States.” See
GAO FIREARMS TRAFFICKING REPORT, supra note 22, at 16. The National Rifle Association
ardently denies the accuracy of these numbers and asserts that ample evidence exists to show
that the vast majority of weapons used by drug cartels in Mexico come from Russia and
China via Guatemala and other Latin American countries. Perez, supra note 19, at C1. This
allegation is not entirely inconsistent, however, with the story of weapons being
manufactured abroad and then smuggled to persons in the United States who carry the
weapons into Mexico. The problem is thus still encompassed in the larger dilemma of
preventing weapons from flowing from the United States into Mexico.
25
Some have estimated that every day, approximately 2,000 guns flow into Mexico from
the United States. THE BRADY CTR., supra note 12, at 7.
26
James V. Grimaldi & Sari Horwitz, Cuts Threaten ATF’s Efforts to Stem Flow of Guns
South, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2011, at A1 (explaining that the most recent White House
budget proposal sought 12.8% cuts in ATF spending).
27
Kim Murphy, Understaffed and Under the Gun, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2011, at A8 (“We
don’t have the ability to follow up on investigations because we don’t have the resources to
do so . . . .” (quoting an anonymous ATF agent)).
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border has significantly increased from just eighty-four agents in 2006 to
224 in 2010, the number remains insufficient to combat the problem
without dismantling the top cartel leadership. 28 Additionally, due to
stringent opposition from the National Rifle Association (NRA), the
lobbying organization that most ardently stands up for unqualified gun
rights for individuals, the ATF has not had a Senate-confirmed director
since 2006. 29 The resulting ATF manpower is not sufficient to carry out the
stated goal of stemming the tide of weapons smuggled daily into Mexico.
One way to make up for insufficient resources is to ensure that the
criminal laws afford law enforcement the necessary means to dismantle the
organizations that threaten public safety. But law enforcement presently
does not have the necessary legal tools to combat gun trafficking from the
United States into Mexico. The current statutory regime, which consists of
the federal criminal code and sentencing guidelines that criminalize and
punish weapons offenses, is insufficient to dismantle gun-smuggling
organizations operating with near impunity along the U.S.–Mexico border.
The level of knowledge required to prove weapons offenses and the
inflexibility of the criminal elements make even clear-cut cases difficult to
prove. As a result, insufficient and inconsistent penalties ensure that the
punishment does not fit the crime and that the crimes are not taken seriously
enough.
In response to the Fast and Furious scandal, the House of
Representatives has proposed H.R. 2554, a statute that would for the first
time criminalize weapons trafficking in the United States and punish
offenders more severely than the federal code currently punishes violators
of weapons offenses. 30 Although it solves many of the current problems, a
trafficking statute alone, in the absence of more comprehensive measures,
will not do enough to stem the flow of weapons into Mexico.
This Comment will explain the deficiencies in the current regime and
describe how H.R. 2554 fails to solve the entire problem. Part I explains
the current tools in the law enforcement arsenal by examining what conduct
the penal code criminalizes and what penalties exist for buyers and sellers
of weapons. Part II examines why high knowledge requirements and low,
28

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF ATF’S PROJECT
GUNRUNNER 6 (2010) [hereinafter REVIEW OF ATF’S PROJECT GUNRUNNER].
29
This means that neither the Republican Bush Administration nor the Democratic
Obama Administration has been able to come up with an appointee who has passed Senate
confirmation. Evan Perez & Devlin Barrett, ATF Chief Likely to Be Ousted, WALL ST. J.,
June 18, 2011, at A2; see also Sari Horwitz, Gun Regulator Lacks Resources, Leadership,
WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2012, at A10; Editorial, A Better Gun Agency,WASH. POST, June 27,
2011, at A16.
30
Stop Gun Trafficking and Strengthen Law Enforcement Act of 2011, H.R. 2554, 112th
Cong. (2011).
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ungraduated penalties are insufficient to combat weapons trafficking on the
border. Part III illustrates the consequences of the current regime in three
ways: (1) by contrasting an atypical weapons prosecution, where the
sentencing judge departed upward from the federal sentencing guidelines,
with an example of how the current statutes lead to prosecutors bringing
extremely odd charges; (2) by describing the ultimate breakdown in
enforcement of the weapons statutes—Operation Fast and Furious—which
has contributed to countless deaths in Mexico and the death of Agent Terry;
and (3) by examining international implications for maintaining the current
statutory regime. Part IV analyzes the proposed legislation in the wake of
the Fast and Furious scandal and speculates whether the statute could
ultimately become law. Part IV also proposes additional statutory measures
that comprehensively focus on international trafficking in an effort to curb
abuses along the border. Part V concludes by calling upon Congress to
debate openly how to balance the Second Amendment right to bear arms
with a need to keep Americans, and our international neighbors, safe from
violence perpetrated by drug traffickers along the United States–Mexico
border.
I. CURRENT TOOLS IN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ARSENAL
United States law enforcement is vastly underequipped to battle
international weapons trafficking. The archetypal trafficking situation
involves the following two transactions, each with its own problems for law
enforcement. First, a straw purchaser buys weapons either from a federally
licensed weapons dealer (a federal firearm licensee, or FFL) or from an
unlicensed dealer legally selling his personal collection, possibly at an
unregulated gun show. 31 Second, the straw purchaser sells or delivers the
weapons to individuals who illegally possess and smuggle them across the
border into Mexico. 32 A trafficker is thus involved in both a purchase and a
sale.
Federal law enforcement is limited to investigating only those actions
criminalized under the federal criminal code. Because there is no federal
law 33 that criminalizes trafficking weapons, the most common arrests and
31

See, e.g., Perez, supra note 19, at C1 (“Many traffickers prefer to tap small-time
buyers for a handful of purchases at a time.”).
32
This stage could involve a single person or it could involve a “sophisticated
network[]” of transfers until the weapons reach their final destination. Id.
33
This Comment’s scope is limited to federal laws and federal law enforcement. State
laws generally involve state permitting systems that regulate whether citizens may be further
restricted, on top of federal restrictions, by states that wish to prevent the carrying of
weapons by certain persons or in certain locations. See, e.g., Right-to-Carry 2012, NAT’L
RIFLE ASS’N-INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/
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investigations involve persons who lie on federal forms in order to obtain
weapons. The sentences for violating those laws are determined by both the
federal sentencing guidelines and judicial precedent. 34 An examination of
the regime suggests that penalties are too lenient to put pressure on
domestic straw purchasers, meaning that most domestic buyers are more
willing to accept an unsubstantial penalty (usually probation) than to
provide information to law enforcement on other members of a dangerous
drug-trafficking organization.
The law pertaining to weapons sellers allows for the unregulated sale
of weapons from one’s personal collection. This both assists straw
purchasers in obtaining weapons and allows the straw purchasers to legally
liquidate “all or part of [their] personal collection[s]”35 to another party who
will then smuggle the weapons across the border. The law is thus
excessively weak with respect to both purchasers and sellers.
A. FEDERAL CRIMINAL ACTIONS AND PENALTIES FOR WEAPONS
PURCHASERS

Law enforcement officers utilize two main tools—18 U.S.C. §§ 922
and 924—in order to investigate and prosecute weapons purchasers. The
most commonly used provisions in fighting weapons trafficking are the
“lying and buying” provisions. 36 The first of these makes it illegal to
“knowingly . . . make any false or fictitious oral or written statement or to
furnish or exhibit any false, fictitious, or misrepresented identification,
intended or likely to deceive . . . with respect to any fact material to the
lawfulness of the sale.” 37 The second criminalizes “knowingly mak[ing]
any false statement or representation with respect to the information
required” to be kept under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 924. 38 All firearm sales
involving a federal firearm licensee require the purchaser to fill out ATF
Form 4473, and the most common violations of these two provisions occur
when a purchaser provides false information on the form. 39 Charges
articles/2012/right-to-carry-2012.aspx.
34
See discussion infra Part I.C.
35
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C) (2006).
36
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the N. Dist. of Ga., Two Charged
for “Lying and Buying” Firearms Scheme (Apr. 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.
gov/usao/gan/press/2011/04-29-11.html.
37
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6).
38
Id. § 924(a)(1)(A). The difference between this subsection and § 922(a)(6) is that the
latter requires that the false statement be material to the legality of the firearm purchase—a
more stringent requirement than simply any false statement made in connection with the
purchase. See REVIEW OF ATF’S PROJECT GUNRUNNER, supra note 28, at 59–60 n.81.
39
See MINORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, OUTGUNNED:
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS WARN CONGRESS THEY LACK ADEQUATE TOOLS TO COUNTER
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brought against straw purchasers are thus not usually for trafficking or even
illegally possessing weapons, but for merely lying on a federal form. 40
The penalties for violating these laws are as unsubstantial as the act of
falsifying a form. Whoever violates the lying and buying provision and
makes a false statement in purchasing a weapon is subject to a maximum
penalty of five years in prison and a fine.41 The penalty increases to a
maximum of ten years’ imprisonment for giving false information material
to the legality of the weapon purchase.42 Moreover, possession by a
prohibited person is punishable by a maximum of ten years in prison. 43
Sentences actually delivered however, are far lower. 44
B. FEDERAL CRIMINAL ACTIONS AND PENALTIES FOR WEAPONS
SELLERS

Section 922 first makes it a crime for anyone not a “licensed importer,
licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to engage in the business of
importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms,” thus restricting sales of
weapons and ammunition to those who have a government license.45
Notably, however, this statute does not require everyone who sells a
weapon to have a federal firearm license, just those who are “engage[d] in
the business” of selling weapons. 46 This is defined as:
[A] person who devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms as a regular
course of trade or business with the principal objective of livelihood and profit . . .
but . . . shall not include a person who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or
purchases of firearms for the enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or
47
who sells all or part of his personal collection of firearms.

ILLEGAL FIREARMS TRAFFICKING 8–9 (2011) [hereinafter OUTGUNNED].
40
Id. at 9 (“[B]order state U.S. attorneys have complained that district court judges view
these prosecutions as mere paper violations.”) (quoting Rep. Carolyn Maloney).
41
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A).
42
Id. § 924(a)(2).
43
Id.
44
See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the average range of sentences for weapons
crimes.
45
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). Further provisions pertaining to the licensing of FFLs are
contained in 18 U.S.C. § 923.
46
Id. § 922(a)(1)(A).
47
Id. § 921(a)(21)(C) (emphasis added). “[P]rincipal objective of livelihood and profit”
is further defined to emphasize the limited scope of the term firearms dealers, whose
motivation must be “predominantly one of obtaining livelihood and pecuniary gain, as
opposed to other intents, such as improving or liquidating a personal firearms
collection . . . .” Id. § 921(a)(22). Putting these provisions together, a seller can “liquidate”
an entire collection of an indiscriminate number of weapons without needing an FFL so long
as this is not the seller’s livelihood.
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Known as the “gun show loophole” because private collections are
often sold off at unregulated gun shows, this allows a person to sell his or
her private collection without being subject to the reporting or documentary
requirements of the criminal code. 48
Additionally, the criminal code penalizes the sale of weapons to
certain classifications of people. This includes persons who are unlawfully
or illegally in the United States,49 felons or those under indictment, 50 drug
addicts, 51 and those who have been adjudicated to be mentally deficient, 52
among others. The code also prevents these same categories of persons
from owning a weapon. 53
Sellers of firearms may face a year in prison for lying about
information that must be kept in sales records pursuant to the United States
Code. 54 Sale to a prohibited purchaser is punishable by a maximum of ten
years in prison. 55 The ultimate sentences, however, end up being much
lower. 56
Apart from criminal prosecutions, the Attorney General possesses
administrative power to suspend or revoke any firearms licenses or apply a
civil penalty if an FFL “willfully” violates the provisions of the United
States Code or pertinent regulations promulgated by the Justice
Department. 57 Generally, these involve recordkeeping requirements that
notify ATF of potential traffickers, such as falsification of purchase records,
missing inventory, or failure to alert authorities to certain purchaser
conduct. 58 For example, under the Gun Control Act, gun sellers are
48

See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Congressman Mike Quigley, U.S. Representatives
Convene Chicago Forum on Gun Show Loophole (Aug. 19, 2010), available at
http://quigley.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=368&Itemid=9
(describing “a gap in federal law that allows private gun dealers to sell weapons to anyone—
including terrorists, felons, and the mentally disabled—without performing background
checks”).
49
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(5).
50
Id. § 922(d)(1).
51
Id. § 922(d)(3).
52
Id. § 922(d)(4).
53
See id. § 922(g).
54
Id. § 924(a)(3).
55
Id. § 924(a)(2).
56
See the discussion of average sentences issued for violations of gun-sale laws at infra
Part II.B.
57
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(p)(1)(A); id. § 923(e); see also BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO,
AND FIREARMS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE UNITED STATES 30
(2000) [hereinafter COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE UNITED STATES] (observing that one
result of certain violations might be to “strongly encourage the dealer to voluntarily
surrender the license”).
58
See COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 57, at 30 (“[H]onest
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required to notify ATF when a purchaser buys multiple handguns within a
five-day span. 59
The Obama Administration has recently pushed to increase the
regulatory tools available to ATF. In July 2011, the Administration
promulgated a rule that instituted similar reporting requirements for
semiautomatic long rifles in certain states along the Mexican border.60
FFLs who sold weapons defined as assault weapons by the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 were formerly subject to
penalty, but no longer. Commonly known as the Assault Weapons Ban,
Title XI, Section A of the Act defined assault weapons and prohibited their
“manufacture, transfer, or possess[ion].” 61 The law expired in 2004 and
Congress has not reinstated it, despite a request from the Obama
Administration. 62
C. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

The nonbinding federal sentencing guidelines also play a role in the
punishments that judges give to violators of the United States’ gun laws. 63
Base offense levels under the guidelines take into account facts such as the
caliber and strength of the weapons involved and the number of prior felony
errors should not be a basis for revocation . . . .”). For more information on potential
indicators of trafficking by gun dealers, see, e.g., Bruce Reinhart, Implementing a Firearms
Trafficking Strategy—Prosecuting Corrupt Federal Firearms Licensees, 50 U.S. ATT’Y
BULL. 40–47 (2002).
59
This portion of the Gun Control Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(3)(A), requires
FFLs to “report multiple sales [two or more within five days] of handguns to their local ATF
field office.” REVIEW OF ATF’S PROJECT GUNRUNNER, supra note 28, at 36.
60
The rule applies to sales of semiautomatic rifles greater than .22 caliber with
detachable magazines in the states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The
National Rifle Association immediately vowed to sue over the Administration’s right to pass
the regulation. James V. Grimaldi & Sari Horwitz, 4 Border States Face New Rule on Gun
Sales, WASH. POST, July 12, 2011, at A3.
61
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 110102(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1996.
62
See Jason Ryan, Obama to Seek New Assault Weapon Ban, ABC News (Feb. 25, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=6960824&page=1#.TxryqW9STwA (quoting Eric
Holder: “I think that will have a positive impact in Mexico, at a minimum”).
63
The federal sentencing guidelines are not mandatory and judges are not required to
levy sentences within the guidelines. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005)
(invalidating “the provision that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the
applicable Guidelines range”). Given the inability of higher courts to make sure district
courts deliver sentences within the sentencing guidelines, using the sentencing guidelines to
make up for deficiencies in the United States Code is an inefficient and unpredictable way to
increase penalties on convicted weapons traffickers. It remains a useful tool, however, given
the way in which judges look to the guidelines in handing out sentences, even if they are not
entirely consistent.
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convictions of the person charged. Violation of either of the two lying and
buying provisions results in an offense level of 14 and carries a suggested
sentence of 15–21 months if the defendant “committed the offense with
knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that the offense would result in the
transfer of a firearm or ammunition to a prohibited person.” 64 The offense
level could jump to 20, with a suggested sentence of 33–41 months, if the
violation involved a semiautomatic weapon. 65 The highest base offense
level is given for an illegal action involving a semiautomatic firearm
committed by a person with two or more prior felony convictions. 66
Once the base offense level is calculated, the guidelines allow for
certain increases that are specifically pertinent to weapons trafficking.
These include situations where the transaction involves a large number of
weapons, 67 the weapons are extremely high powered, 68 the serial numbers
are somehow altered or damaged, 69 the defendant was engaged in
“trafficking,” 70 the defendant knew or believed that the weapons would be
transported out of the United States,71 or the recordkeeping offense
“reflected an effort to conceal a substantive offense involving firearms.” 72
The federal sentencing guidelines thus have the potential to increase
punishment for high-volume straw purchasers, even though the offenses are
for paper, rather than substantive, violations. They do not, however, assist
in punishing the leaders of trafficking organizations. These persons are
largely unreachable under current law and can continue coordinating the
trafficking of weapons through new straw purchasers willing to risk a short
64

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(6) & ch. 5, pt. A (2012). In this
and all subsequent descriptions, I will note the suggested sentences for first-time offenders
only since these are the persons generally recruited as straw purchasers given that
individuals with a criminal history are not permitted to purchase weapons.
65
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) & ch. 5, pt. A.
66
This situation provides for a base offense level of 26, which results in a 63-to-78month sentence. See § 2K2.1(a)(1) & ch. 5, pt. A.
67
For conduct involving 3–7 weapons, the guidelines add 2 levels; for conduct involving
8–24 weapons, they add 4 levels; for conduct involving 25–99 weapons, they add 6 levels;
for conduct involving 100–199 weapons, they add 8 levels; and for conduct involving 200 or
more weapons, they add 10 levels. Using a base level of 14, this results in an increase of six,
twelve, eighteen, twenty-six, or thirty-six months, respectively. § 2K2.1(b)(1) & ch. 5, pt. A.
68
This includes missiles and portable rockets, and results in an increase of 15 levels, or
seventy-two months. § 2K2.1(b)(3) & ch. 5, pt. A.
69
An altered serial number would make tracing the source of the weapon much more
difficult. This adds 4 levels or twelve months. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) & ch. 5, pt. A.
70
Trafficking is not defined within the guidelines, however. The result is an increase of
4 levels or twelve months. § 2K2.1(b)(5) & ch. 5, pt. A.
71
This increases 4 levels to at least level 18, which adds twelve months.
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(A) & ch. 5, pt. A.
72
The judge may increase the sentence to the level of the substantive offense.
§ 2K2.1(b)(7).
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probation sentence for a quick payment.
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT STATUTORY REGIME
Overall, the present statutory regime is insufficient to combat the
problem of international weapons trafficking across the United States–
Mexico border for two reasons. First, the level of knowledge required by
the code to prove mere paper violations is too high, making it difficult for
prosecutors to bring and win these cases. The amount of legwork and
information required to prove knowing violations is disproportionate to the
reward of obtaining a paperwork violation. Second, the penalties are too
low and are not graduated enough to deter weapons violations adequately.
Minimal penalties that require significant evidence of knowledge
ensure that prosecutors will not expend the resources necessary to conduct
these types of cases. Without a statute that explicitly criminalizes weapons
trafficking, prosecutors have problems proving cases against straw
purchasers and have no way to pursue leaders of trafficking organizations.
Consequently, law enforcement faces a continuous stream of straw
purchasers—recruited by narcotrafficking organizations operating in
Mexico—who can legally purchase weapons and pass them along to
traffickers who will smuggle the weapons across the border.
A. STRICT INTENT REQUIREMENT MAKES CASES DIFFICULT TO
PROSECUTE

The intent requirement for the weapons violations involving straw
purchasers established by 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 924 is “knowing.” 73 The
intent requirement pertaining to violations made by sellers of weapons is
either “knowing” or “reasonable cause to believe.” 74 In other words,
prosecutors must show that the straw purchaser knew, at the time he made
the statement at issue, that it was false. The law thus requires a subjective
determination that allows defendants to carefully craft legal excuses for
illegal behavior. 75 These difficulties mean that many prosecutions are
dropped or result in weak sentences. 76 Data is rarely compiled, but a report
73

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6), 924(a)(1)(A) (2006); supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.B.
75
As an example, the federal form requires purchasers to check a box that indicates
whether the purchase is being made on behalf of another party. For a prosecutor to show
that the purchaser lied, thus violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), the prosecutor must show that
the purchaser, at the time of purchase, knew that he was purchasing the weapon for another
person yet indicated on the form that the weapon was for the purchaser himself. It is easy to
claim that a decision to sell personal stock occurred after this initial purchase, such that the
purchaser did not lie on the form.
76
See, e.g., James C. McKinley Jr., Prosecutors Seek Appeal in Dismissal of Gun Case,
74
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on Project Gunrunner cases shows that out of 607 total cases referred to
U.S. Attorneys’ Offices by ATF agents, prosecutors rejected approximately
one out of four lying and buying cases. 77 In one Arizona case, even though
the defendants knew that they had made false statements about the ultimate
recipient of the weapons purchased, the false statements were not
sufficiently material to uphold the charge, much less a conviction.78 The
court there required the prosecutors to show that the ultimate recipient of
the weapons—the person who hired the charged straw purchasers—was
himself a “prohibited possessor.” 79
Another example is illustrative of the difficulty that prosecutors have
in proving these types of violations. In 2008, a .50-caliber Barrett rifle sold
by former FBI agent John Shipley was found at a crime scene in the state of
Chihuahua, Mexico. 80 As a result, federal law enforcement raided
Shipley’s home, seizing twenty-eight firearms as well as sales records and
cash. 81 Prosecutors charged Shipley with six counts, including dealing in
firearms without a license and knowingly lying on the ATF form by stating
that he was purchasing weapons for his own personal use.82 Shipley
explained that he used gun sales to build his private collection and did not
sell the weapons to make a living. 83 During the investigation, Shipley
turned over to agents false sales records, which prosecutors believed created
a strong case “of deceit.” 84 At trial, Shipley was found guilty of all six
counts against him, but not before he made an ardent defense. As an ATF
agent admitted during the trial, it is not illegal to sell any part of one’s
“private collection,” and there is no definition or time limit for when a
weapon becomes a part of one’s private collection. 85 According to the
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at A13 (discussing a state case in Arizona in which charges of
violating federal gun laws were dismissed by the court).
77
REVIEW OF ATF’S PROJECT GUNRUNNER, supra note 28, at 65. Prosecutors rejected
32% of referrals for knowingly making a false statement material to a gun purchase and 21%
of referrals for knowingly making a false statement. Id. By comparison, prosecutors only
rejected possession with intent to distribute charges 7% of the time and drug conspiracy
cases 9%. Id. Twenty-nine percent of total referrals were pending a decision. Id.
78
McKinley, supra note 76, at A13.
79
Id. (explaining that federal agents possessed documents indicating that the defendant
“sold hundreds of weapons” over a two-year span that were “in turn smuggled . . . to the
Beltrán Leyva cartel in Mexico”).
80
Perez, supra note 19, at C1.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at C2 (“‘What he was doing was seeking to enhance his collection and seeking to
advance his professional skills . . . ,’ said Mr. Pérez, the lawyer . . . .”).
84
Id. (explaining also that private sellers are not required to keep accurate records of
sales from their personal collections or even to maintain records at all).
85
Id. (“‘The straw-purchase statute is very vague,’ he says. ‘You have to prove the
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agent, “[b]uyers can easily explain their actions even if they buy and sell
firearms over short periods of time.” 86 Despite being convicted on six
counts of violations, Shipley was sentenced to just two years in prison.87
Even though prosecutors successfully obtained a conviction, Shipley’s
trial shows the difficulty in prosecuting cases involving weapons violations.
To demonstrate knowing violations, agents must procure a wealth of
information including potentially detailed information about where the
weapons will go after the straw purchase. The statutory requirements raise
the bar on agents and prosecutors attempting to build cases against
gunrunners, forcing a large infusion of resources that is oftentimes not
available. The requirements also necessitate that judges and juries
determine the seller or purchaser’s intent, which allows sophisticated
organizations to circumvent the law easily.
B. LOW, UNGRADUATED PENALTIES DO NOT ALLOW FOR
FLEXIBILITY

A second flaw in the present statutory regime is a sentencing structure
that is oftentimes too lenient when compared to the potential consequences
of the illicit actions. Maximum sentences for the most commonly charged
crimes are either five or ten years. 88 However, the actual sentences
imposed on illegal purchasers are generally much more lenient. Using data
compiled between 2004 and 2009, those charged with knowingly making a
false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A) received sentences
averaging just fourteen months even though the maximum sentence is five
years. 89 The sentences imposed for knowingly making a false statement in
connection with a firearm purchase in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)
averaged just twelve months, even though the maximum sentence possible
is ten years. 90 In fact, over this time period, 40% of those convicted of
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) received nothing more than probation.91
The very structure of the sentencing guidelines ensures that straw
purchasers will receive lower sentences. One key aspect of the sentencing
guidelines is increased punishment for repeat offenders; first-time offenders
receive lighter sentences. 92 Yet convicted felons may not legally purchase
person went in with the intention of deceiving the government and the gun dealer by saying
they were buying for themselves but were really buying for someone else.’”).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
See supra Parts I.A & I.B for a discussion of the criminal statutes.
89
REVIEW OF ATF’S PROJECT GUNRUNNER, supra note 28, at 62.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 62–63.
92
Id.

600

MICHAEL KRANTZ

[Vol. 103

firearms, so trafficking organizations must hire straw purchasers with no
prior convictions. 93 The penalties for straw purchasers are thus guaranteed
to be on the lenient side of the guidelines. Unless they depart upward from
the sentencing guidelines, judges will often not be able to impose lengthy
prison sentences on straw purchasers. 94 Sellers do not get any more
stringent attention. The United States Code allows for civil penalties or up
to one year in prison for failing to maintain adequate records as required.95
As an example, the ATF Deputy Director, in testimony before
Congress in 2010, described a case where ATF had dismantled a guntrafficking ring. The ring involved twenty-three suspects who trafficked
336 firearms over a span of thirteen months. 96 The group made ninety-six
different firearms purchases from ten different firearms dealers, spending
$367,419, mainly in cash.97 ATF traced many of the firearms during the
investigation and connected the weapons to the deaths of eighteen law
enforcement officers and civilians.98 Despite the scope of this operation,
the members of the organization received sentences ranging from three
months’ to eight years’ imprisonment for their various roles.99
The penalties are also somewhat inflexible. For example, the criminal
code does not allow for a higher penalty when more firearms are involved,
like the code allows for varying quantities of illegal drugs. There is also no
distinction as to whether the gun involved is a handgun or an automatic
assault weapon. Instead a prosecutor must rely on the nonbinding
sentencing guidelines to take these factors into consideration. 100 As for the
law pertaining to illicit purchases, the only real distinction is whether the
straw purchaser lied about a fact material to the legality of the weapons
purchase, which carries a maximum penalty of ten years, 101 or whether the
straw purchaser merely lied, which carries a penalty of five years.102 The
law also allows for either a suspension or revocation of a seller’s firearm
license, 103 but leaves almost no penalty for minor or first-time-seller
offenses other than a potential one-year prison sentence for lying on
93

Id. at 62.
But see United States v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 3006 (2011); infra Part III.A.
95
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 923(e), 924(a)(3), 924(p)(1)(A) (2006).
96
REVIEW OF ATF’S PROJECT GUNRUNNER, supra note 28, at 39.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
101
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2006).
102
Id. §§ 922(a)(6), 924(a)(1)(D).
103
See id. §§ 923(e), 924(p)(1)(A).
94
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necessary records. 104 The criminal code does not distinguish between one
weapon illegally bought or sold and dozens illegally bought or sold.
This regime is quite contrary to the criminal punishments available for
the possession or sale of illegal narcotics. 105 Punishments for violations of
the federal narcotics laws are determined by an elaborate scheduling
system. Different substances are categorized into five schedules based on
likelihood of abuse and legitimate, legal reasons for use.106 In addition to
determining punishment by the type of drug involved, the punishment
differs by amount, so that a person illegally possessing greater quantities of
a drug receives a larger punishment. 107 These graduated penalties based on
varying levels of criminal behavior allow prosecutors to tailor charges to
both higher-level drug dealers and lower-level drug dealers accordingly. It
also appropriately provides the opportunity to lower charges in exchange
for information should the defendant be willing to turn on those above him
in the criminal organization. 108
Gun laws also contain no lower penalty for diminished mens rea, like
104

See id. § 924(a)(3). A study conducted by ATF in 2000 reviewed administrative
compliance mechanisms. COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 57, at
31. The study found that of 1,700 compliance inspections of FFLs in fiscal year 1999, 400
resulted in violations. Id. Of these 400 violations, ATF took the following actions: license
revocation for 3%; license surrender or denial of renewal for 19%; warning conferences or
warning letters for 39%. Id. While most violations brought added scrutiny in the form of
subsequent inspections, less than a quarter (22%) led to a loss of license, whereas 39 resulted
in merely a warning. Id. More recent data suggests that both inspections and criminal
referrals have increased in the recent years, by 133% and 47%, respectively. REVIEW OF
ATF’S PROJECT GUNRUNNER, supra note 28, at iii.
105
The United States Code does penalize the illegal possession of a firearm, but,
considering that it is easy to recruit straw purchasers who can legally purchase a firearm,
those statutes are irrelevant for fighting international weapons trafficking. Lying and buying
statutes are the main tool in the fight against trafficking, much like possession with intent to
distribute statutes are most commonly used to fight drug trafficking, making it appropriate to
compare these two regimes.
106
These range from some preparations of cough syrup (Schedule V) to heroin
(Schedule I). Controlled Substance Schedules, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN., OFF. DIVERSION CONTROL, http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/ (last
visited Apr. 22, 2013).
107
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006) (punishing, for example, possession of five kilograms
or more of cocaine with ten years in prison, but possession of 500 grams or more with five
years’ imprisonment). For further discussion of the complexity of U.S. controlled-substance
laws, see Benton Brooks Bodamer, Note, Psychoactive Substances, Dietary Supplements,
and the War on “Drugs”: Law, Myth, and Tradition as the Social Control of Consciousness,
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1311, 1317–25 (2005).
108
While the sentencing guidelines do include a provision that allows judges to lower
sentences based on the defendant’s cooperation with authorities, reliance on the nonbinding
guidelines is less reliable and uniform than changes to the criminal code itself. See
discussion supra note 63.
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there is with homicide in most state criminal codes. Under federal weapons
statutes, prosecutors must prove a “knowing” violation of weapons laws in
all cases. 109 But often in criminal law, the same action can be punished
differently based on the level of mens rea with which that action was
carried out. For example, most state criminal codes distinguish between
accidental and intentional killings, designating one negligent or accidental
homicide and the other first-degree murder. 110 The action and the
accompanying mens rea are both punished, and penalties are graduated
based on the level of intent involved. 111 While there is some logical
dissonance to a crime called negligent or reckless weapons trafficking, there
is also a sense that one can differentiate between a defendant who actively
purchases weapons for cartels and one who acts as a middleman for
weapons purchasers who, unbeknownst to the middleman, are members of a
drug-trafficking organization. In both instances, the harm to society is
equal, since the weapons fall into the hands of dangerous individuals that
the law has determined cannot possess weapons. Society may also find
these actions morally reprehensible given the great potential for harm, and
thus deserving of criminal punishment. The current law as written does not
allow for penalties for those who unknowingly, but perhaps recklessly or
negligently, violate federal weapons laws.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE CURRENT STATUTORY REGIME
The consequences of these shortcomings are stark. First, given the
conduct criminalized in the federal code, the majority of gun crimes are
merely paperwork violations. United States Attorneys’ Offices are less
likely to accept cases and prosecute defendants accused of these types of
violations. 112 Moreover, cases involving paper violations are generally
much smaller and less likely to involve the persons directing straw
purchasers. Between 2004 and 2009, these types of cases also generally
involved one or just a few defendants; 83% of cases referred to U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices during that time involved only one or two defendants
and only 2% involved more than ten defendants.113 Prosecutors have told
agents that they prefer to handle multidefendant conspiracies rather than
109

See discussion supra Part I.A.
According to a fifty-state survey, all fifty states and the District of Columbia
distinguish between different types of murder. Many contain intermediate stages, like
second-degree murder or manslaughter as well. THOMPSON REUTERS/WEST, AGGRAVATING
AND MITIGATING FACTORS FOR HOMICIDE (STATUTES) tbl.1 (2012) (report available via
Westlaw search for “0030 SURVEYS 28”).
111
Id.
112
REVIEW OF ATF’S PROJECT GUNRUNNER, supra note 28, at 51–53.
113
Id. at 52–53.
110
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cases involving a single buyer. 114
The combination of a high mens rea, a low sentence, and cases with a
small number of defendants results in many cases simply not being charged.
Prosecutors must evaluate whether going forward with the prosecution is
worth the time and resources involved. Although recordkeeping on the
issue is sparse, the most common reasons given by prosecutors for
declining to prosecute weapons cases are “lack of evidence of criminal
intent” and “weak or insufficient admissible evidence.”115 Agents also
screen weak cases because they only refer cases for prosecution that, given
their experience, they believe can be prosecuted successfully. 116 Some of
these uncharged cases may simply indicate investigations that did not turn
up violations, but some undoubtedly involve cases of weapons trafficking
lacking the evidence to show “knowing” violations or otherwise deemed
low priority within the office. Anecdotal evidence suggests that higher
penalties would convince more prosecutors to follow through with these
cases. 117
Second, low and inflexible penalties make it more difficult for law
enforcement to make deals with straw purchasers in exchange for
information on others in the organization. There is no higher penalty that
interrogators can use to threaten potential defendants. Facing probation or a
short jail sentence makes it unlikely that a straw purchaser will give
information on a dangerous cartel member. 118 Probation is preferable to
reprisal from a cartel enforcer. Charges that are stiff and inflexible also do
not allow for reduced charges in exchange for information.
Finally, the current statutory regime invites cartels to fund firearmstrafficking organizations through a steady stream of straw purchasers that
are interchangeable at the lowest levels. As long as the straw purchaser has
a clean criminal record, weapons purchases are completely legal. Even if
the purchaser gets caught, the organization merely needs to find another
purchaser who has a clean criminal record and is willing to make the
purchase. 119 Given the lack of recordkeeping and oversight on the
114

Id. at 53.
Id. at 63.
116
Id. (describing the tactics of ATF Agents who “do not refer cases to the USAOs that
they assume would be rejected”).
117
Id. at 65 (“[T]he lack of long sentences is also a key factor in their decisions about
whether to accept these Project Gunrunner cases.”).
118
See, e.g., OUTGUNNED, supra note 39, at 9 (“[W]ith these types of cases, for
somebody to testify against members of a cartel where the alternative is seeing a probation
officer once a month, they’re going to opt toward, you know, not cooperating with the law
enforcement authorities.” (quoting an ATF supervisor)).
119
Sari Horwitz, A Gunrunning Sting Gone Fatally Wrong, WASH. POST, July 26, 2011,
at A1 (explaining that, when caught, “the buyer would get a light punishment, if any, and the
115
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secondary market, straw purchasers can even obtain weapons without
background checks. 120
A. CONTRASTING CASE STUDIES—UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ AND
UNITED STATES V. BOUT

A recent case, United States v. Hernandez, 121 presents a helpful case
study in examining how the sentencing guidelines can be used, but are
generally not used, to fight international weapons trafficking.
In
Hernandez, the defendant pleaded guilty to violating the lying and buying
statute where the false statement was material to the legality of the
purchase, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). 122 On appeal, Hernandez
claimed that his ninety-seven-month sentence was procedurally and
substantively unreasonable because the sentence was based on “judge-found
facts” determined at the sentencing hearing rather than facts decided by the
jury. 123
The sentence was based on facts established at Hernandez’s
rearraignment and contained in the presentencing report. Hernandez
purchased two semiautomatic assault rifles at a sporting goods store and
represented on the federal ATF form that the guns were for his own use,
when in fact Hernandez purchased the weapons for another person who
intended to smuggle the assault rifles into Mexico. 124 Over the course of a
year, Hernandez purchased twenty-three additional weapons, many similar
to the semiautomatic assault rifles involved in the murder of Agent Brian
Terry, at a cost of $24,800. 125 According to the presentencing report,
Hernandez was a prolific member of an organization of around twenty-two
members that purchased approximately 328 weapons with the intention of
transporting them to Mexico to arm the Zetas Drug Cartel.126
Even though the sentencing guidelines suggested a 51–63 month
sentence for the corresponding offense level of 24,127 the sentencing judge
cartel could just find another buyer”).
120
THE BRADY CTR., supra note 12, at 10.
121
See United States v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
3006 (2011).
122
Id. at 371.
123
Id. at 371, 373, 375.
124
Id. at 371–72 (explaining that three of these weapons were recovered at scenes of
violence in Mexico).
125
Id. at 372.
126
Id.
127
The presentence report started with an offense level of 12, pursuant to U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(7), added 8 levels for an offense involving
between 100 and 199 firearms, added 4 levels for firearms trafficking, added 3 levels for a
manager or supervisor role in the offense, and subtracted 3 levels for acceptance of
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departed upward, taking into account the large number of firearms
trafficked—by the entire group and not just Hernandez—and the fact that
many of the firearms were “military type assault rifles.” 128 The presentence
report also identified exceptional circumstances not specifically enumerated
in the sentencing guidelines, such as “(1) that the firearms were used in the
commission of eight murders, (2) that the sheer number of purchases
indicated Hernandez likely knew they would not serve a law-abiding
purpose, and (3) that the future harm of his firearms purchases was
‘immeasurable.’” 129
The Fifth Circuit, in holding that the district court’s decision to depart
upward was reasonable, stated that the crime in question here was “more
serious than the run-of-the-mill case of firearms trafficking, because
military-type assault rifles are more likely to be used by criminal, military,
or terrorist organizations that pose a threat to U.S. security.”130 The Fifth
Circuit further determined that the sentence was reasonable because over
100 weapons were implicated.131 According to the court, the sentencing
guidelines’ marginal increase in penalties for high volumes of trafficking
“may fail to account sufficiently for the seriousness of trafficking where it
involves a large number of firearms.” 132 Finally, the Fifth Circuit
specifically found that the evidence was sufficient such that Hernandez
could have reasonably foreseen that he was arming the Mexican drug
cartels, even if he could not foresee the specific criminal activities for
which the weapons were used. 133 In acting anyway, Hernandez was
“facilitating organizations that pose a significant threat to U.S. and Mexican
national security.” 134 Such an extreme case was sufficient to allow the
district court to reasonably depart upward from the sentencing guidelines,
even though another similar trafficker had only received a forty-six-month
sentence. 135
Whereas Hernandez shows the way that the sentencing guidelines can
be manipulated to increase sentencing for weapons traffickers, a second
responsibility. Id.
128
Both of these factors also came from the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 372–73.
129
Id. at 373.
130
Id. at 378.
131
Id.
132
Id. The court notes that the enhancement for trafficking twenty-five firearms is 10
levels and the enhancement for trafficking 100 firearms 12 levels—just an increase of two
when dealing with four times the number of trafficked firearms. Id.
133
Id. at 378–79.
134
Id. at 379.
135
Id. (citing United States v. Gutierrez, 359 F. App’x 540, 541 (5th Cir. 2010)
(affirming forty-six-month sentence for eight counts of making false, material statements in
purchasing twenty-eight military-style firearms later recovered in Mexico)).
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case study is more indicative of the difficulties in charging conduct using
the current statutory regime. Viktor Bout, nicknamed the “Merchant of
Death,” was a large-scale weapons dealer who has been accused of selling
weapons to insurgency groups and terrorist organizations. 136 When he was
finally captured in Thailand and extradited back to the United States to face
trial, the charges focused on one main arms deal involving the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, FARC). During meetings with undercover DEA agents posing
as middlemen for the FARC, Bout and his coconspirator discussed the
potential sale of:
(1) 700 to 800 surface-to-air missiles; (2) 5,000 AK-47 firearms; (3) millions of
rounds of ammunition; (4) various Russian spare parts for rifles; (5) anti-personnel
land mines and C-4 explosives; (6) night-vision equipment; (7) “ultralight” airplanes,
which could be outfitted with grenade launchers and missiles; (8) unmanned aerial
vehicles, which have a range of 200 to 300 kilometers; and (9) two cargo planes for
137
arms deliveries.

However, when Bout was indicted in the Southern District of New
York, only one of the four counts pertained to a violation of weapons
laws. 138 Because no weapons-trafficking statute currently exists, AUSAs in
the Southern District of New York had to charge the more complicated
conspiracy to kill Americans, which required a showing both that Bout was
trafficking weapons and that those weapons would be used to kill American
citizens. 139 Ultimately, Bout was convicted on all four counts, but the
absurdity remains: a defendant who allegedly trafficked weapons to a
terrorist organization is only tangentially charged with violating any U.S.
weapons laws.
B. A WORST-CASE SCENARIO REALIZED—OPERATION FAST AND
FURIOUS

Faced with the constant stream of weapons traffickers along the border
136

Noah Rosenberg, Guilty Verdict for Russian in Arms Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2011,
at A23 (“Mr. Bout has been accused of furnishing weapons to Al Qaeda and the Taliban and
into civil wars in Africa . . . .”).
137
United States v. Bout, No. 08 Cr. 365 (SAS), 2011 WL 2693720, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July
11, 2011).
138
The four counts charged “conspiracies to (1) kill United States nationals, (2) kill
officers and employees of the United States, (3) acquire, transfer, and use anti-aircraft
missiles, and (4) provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (the ‘FARC’).” Id. at *1 (footnotes
omitted).
139
Bout attempted to dismiss the charges on the ground that there was no nexus between
his activities and the United States, in violation of his Due Process rights. The motion was
denied. See id.
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and a constrictive statutory regime, ATF turned to extreme measures in
order to turn the tide. Instead of interdicting weapons, ATF chose instead
to track the weapons into Mexico in hopes of building cases against leaders
of trafficking organizations. 140 In general, it is against ATF policy to allow
illegal firearms to “walk” into the hands of criminals who would use them
in acts of violence.141 Furthermore, ATF prodded weapons dealers to make
sales to illegal purchasers that the dealers would not otherwise have
made. 142
The length and breadth of Operation Fast and Furious only became
known to the American public when two assault rifles that had been
followed during the operation were found at the scene of the shooting death
of Customs and Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry on December 14, 2010. 143
Agent Terry was patrolling the U.S.–Mexico border when he and his
partner engaged two persons who were preparing to ambush and steal from
illegal immigrants crossing the border. 144 The bandits fired on the agents
and Terry was killed. 145 Whistleblowers within ATF contacted a U.S.
Senator, explaining that ATF had allowed guns to “walk,” resulting in
Terry’s death. 146 After a public outcry over the death of a U.S. law
enforcement agent, Congress began an investigation into the matter.147 As
the information trickled out, it became clear that Operation Fast and Furious
extended far beyond the two weapons found at the scene of Brian Terry’s
murder. According to ATF, 1,765 guns were sold to suspected smugglers
during the fifteen-month Fast and Furious operation. 148
The congressional investigation revealed that the weapons recovered
on December 14 were a small part of a much larger operation intended to
build cases against high-level members of DTOs, who often use U.S.-made
weapons to secure passage of narcotics into the United States. 149 Arresting
140

See ACCOUNTS OF ATF AGENTS, supra note 4, at 12.
Id. at 11–12 (discussing that agents may allow an illegal weapons transaction to
continue “to further an investigation” but must interdict the weapons “at some point” if the
agent has knowledge that the transfer was illegal).
142
See Richard A. Serrano, Gun Seller in Sting Had Doubts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011,
at A1 (“To customers with phony IDs or wads of cash he normally would have turned away,
[one dealer] sold pistols, rifles and semiautomatics.”).
143
Grimaldi & Horwitz, supra note 1, at A4.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
James V. Grimaldi, ATF Faces Federal Review over Tactics to Foil Gunrunning
Rings, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2011, at A4.
148
Kim Murphy, Border Effort Let Guns into Criminal Hands, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2011,
at A1.
149
Grimaldi & Horwitz, supra note 26, at A1 (according to former United States
141
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straw purchasers had not succeeded in stemming the tide of weapons
flowing south into Mexico, so the ATF consciously decided to go after the
heads of the hydra. 150 ATF explained “[t]hat was the shift in strategy . . .
we recognized that unless we went after the head of the organization, the
person ordering the guns, ordering the violence, we were going to have
little to no success in stemming the violence down there.” 151 In order to
bring charges against kingpins in the Mexican DTOs, the agents needed
proof that the weapons were going to the cartels to be used in furtherance of
crimes. 152 Of course, the obvious flaw in the operation was that closing the
loop between straw purchasers and cartel leaders created the foreseeable
risk that cartels would use the noninterdicted weapons in violent crimes. 153
The weapons logged and traced by ATF in Arizona began surfacing at
scenes of violent crime in Mexico.154 In March 2010, ATF recorded 958
killings in Mexico and 359 purchased guns that were traced as part of
Operation Fast and Furious. 155 As of July 2011, law enforcement recovered
122 weapons directly traceable to Operation Fast and Furious at scenes of
violent crimes in Mexico.156 In one particularly heinous example, two Fast
and Furious weapons were recovered in connection with the kidnapping and
murder of the brother of the Attorney General of the Mexican state of

Attorney for the District of Arizona, Dennis Burke, “‘Mexican drug lords go shopping for
war weapons in Arizona’”).
150
In October 2009, the Department of Justice, which oversees the ATF, sent an e-mail
to border supervisors instructing ATF to “broaden its scope to ‘identify, investigate, and
eliminate’ the cartels” by focusing on higher level targets. The memo did not, however,
suggest the specific strategy of allowing firearms to “walk” across the Mexican border.
Richard A. Serrano, ATF Gun Operation Troubled Early On, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, at
A1.
151
Murphy, supra note 148, at A14.
152
See supra Part I.A (explaining that knowing violations of buying statutes must be
shown).
153
See ACCOUNTS OF ATF AGENTS, supra note 4, at 27 (“DOJ and ATF determined that
the goal of making the big case was worth the risk of letting hundreds and hundreds of guns
go to criminals in the process.”).
154
See id. at 36.
155
See id. at 36–37. This is not to say that the 359 guns traced by ATF in March 2010
were used in the 958 deaths, just that there was a high number of deaths in a month where
ATF walked a high number of guns.
156
JOINT STAFFS OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM & S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 112TH CONG., THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS:
FUELING CARTEL VIOLENCE 8–9 (2011) [hereinafter FUELING CARTEL VIOLENCE]. Moreover,
a member of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the Mexican Congress,
said that he knew of “150 cases of injuries and homicides with arms that were smuggled and
passed illegally into our country” during Operation Fast and Furious. Kim Murphy & Ken
Ellingwood, Mexico Demands Answers on Guns, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2011, at A1.
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Chihuahua. 157 Fast and Furious weapons were also implicated in an
incident where cartel members grounded a Mexican police helicopter. 158
ATF members even reported to Congress that they were concerned that Fast
and Furious weapons were used in the shooting of Congresswoman
Gabrielle Giffords in Arizona in January 2010, although this turned out not
to be the case. 159
Despite contributing to the horrific proliferation of violence in Mexico,
Operation Fast and Furious achieved some of its main objectives. ATF
confirmed that weapons purchased by their targets in the southwest United
States were ending up in the hands of narcotraffickers when the weapons
were recovered at Mexican crime scenes. 160 Mexican law enforcement also
recovered Fast and Furious weapons at the home of a known cartel
enforcer. 161 Finally, the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of
Arizona issued a 53-count indictment alleging that a number of persons
were involved in a complex scheme to purchase and smuggle hundreds of
weapons to the Mexican drug cartels. 162 Yet even this success is marginal
since those charged as a result of Operation Fast and Furious are largely
minor straw purchasers, charged under the lying and buying provisions.163
ATF made a conscious decision to employ incredibly dangerous
investigative tactics because there is no other way, under the current
regime, to adequately pursue bosses who organize gun trafficking rings.
Further underscoring the inadequacy in the system, ATF agents still did not
have the information or tools to prosecute cases, even after they had proof
that the weapons were being smuggled into Mexico. The only real result of
the massive operation was that ATF obtained more information on the lowlevel straw purchasers that ATF had already identified as targets.164

157
158
159

A7.

160

See FUELING CARTEL VIOLENCE, supra note 156, at 54.
See id. at 57–59.
Kim Murphy, ATF Agents Describe ‘State of Panic,’ L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2011, at

See ACCOUNTS OF ATF AGENTS, supra note 4, at 35–41.
Forty weapons were recovered in Ciudad Juarez at the home of Jose Antonio Torres
Marrufo, a cartel leader and enforcer for the Sinaloa Cartel. Richard A. Serrano, Fast and
Furious Guns Turned up at Cartel Enforcer’s Home, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at A27.
162
Grimaldi & Horwitz, supra note 26, at A1 (explaining further that more than a dozen
persons charged in the indictment were arrested when the indictment was announced).
163
See ACCOUNTS OF ATF AGENTS, supra note 4, at 46–47 (explaining that very little
information gleaned from Operation Fast and Furious was even included in the indictment
since ATF had already built cases on most of the indicted straw purchasers).
164
See id. at 45 (“[W]e knew Jaime Avila [the purchaser of the weapon that was
discovered at the scene of Brian Terry’s murder] was a straw purchaser, had him identified
as a known straw purchaser supplying weapons to the cartel.”).
161
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C. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Changing U.S. weapons laws to prevent trafficking would do more
than just stem drug violence in Mexico—it could help improve relations
with our southern neighbors and other countries around the world. First,
the issue of weapons trafficking is a constant point of contention in the
relationship between Mexico and the United States. On President Obama’s
most recent trip to Mexico in 2009, he and Mexican President Felipe
Calderón discussed the potential for an arms treaty signed by the other
countries of the Western Hemisphere. 165 President Calderón repeated his
call to Speaker of the House John Boehner during the Speaker’s recent
January 2012 visit to Mexico to discuss security issues. 166 The Mexican
government views the flow of weapons from the United States into Mexico
as one of the key factors in the proliferation of drug violence in Mexico and
has pressured the United States to do all it can to stop weapons
trafficking. 167 The issue is clearly one that is important to the Mexican
government, and cooperation could lend itself to reciprocation in other
areas.
The issue of international weapons trafficking has also appeared on the
world stage. In recent years, the United Nations has discussed the potential
for a worldwide arms treaty that would attempt to regulate global
trafficking. 168 In July 2012, the UN convened a worldwide conference “to
elaborate a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common
international standards for the transfer of conventional arms.” 169 Despite
nearly one month of discussions, the parties could not agree to a treaty and
instead decided to reinitiate talks in 2013. 170 In the past, the United States
The U.S.
has been skeptical of multilateral weapons treaties.171
165

See Dudley Althaus, Obama Pushes Latin Arms Treaty, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 17,
2009, at A1.
166
Mexico Presses U.S. House Speaker on Arms Traffic, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 13, 2012,
7:31
PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2017234672_apltmexicoushouse
speaker.html.
167
See Mexico Calls on UN to Help Control Flow of High-Powered Weapons to Drug
Gangs, UN NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID
=39656 (“‘It is unjust and inhuman that the profits of the arms industry should decide the
deaths of thousands of people,’ Mexican President Felipe Calderón told the UN General
Assembly.”).
168
See generally Arms Trade Treaty, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT
AFFAIRS, http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTradeTreaty/ (last visited Feb. 16,
2013) [hereinafter Arms Trade Treaty].
169
G.A. Res. 64/48, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/48 (Jan. 12, 2010).
170
Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 168.
171
The United States is a signatory to but has not yet ratified the Inter-American
Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition,
Explosives, and Other Related Materials, negotiated by the Organization of American States.

2013]

WALKING FIREARMS TO GUNRUNNERS

611

representative to the conference delivered a statement that the United States
“seek[s] a treaty that establishes high international standards for controlling
the transfer of arms . . . to reduce illicit arms trafficking.” 172 The United
States also wanted to ensure that the treaty would not “in any way handicap
the legitimate right of self-defense.” 173 The Secretary General to the United
Nations stressed the “need for all States to ensure that their national systems
and internal controls are at the highest possible standards” to prevent illicit
trafficking. 174 It is hard to say that the United States is currently
accomplishing this goal.
IV. ANALYSIS—PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO COMBAT WEAPONS
TRAFFICKING AND OTHER SOLUTIONS
In response to the congressional inquiry into Operation Fast and
Furious, on July 15, 2011, the House proposed legislation aimed to assist
law enforcement in combating illicit weapons trafficking along the border.
The legislation, entitled the Stop Gun Trafficking and Strengthen Law
Enforcement Act of 2011, 175 was proposed by New York Democrat Carolyn
Maloney and was cosponsored by twenty-nine additional Democratic
legislators. 176 The bill was referred to the House Judiciary Committee and
was subsequently assigned to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security on August 25, 2011. 177 The bill has not moved from
that stage.
A. A NEW STATUTE CRIMINALIZING WEAPONS TRAFFICKING

The proposed legislation does not change any provisions of the
Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related
Materials, Nov. 14, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 143.
172
Donald A. Mahley, U.S. Representative to the Arms Trade Treaty Conference,
Statement at the U.N. Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (July 12, 2012), available at
http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/docs/20120712/20120712_US_E.pdf.
173
Id.
174
U.N. Grp. of Governmental Experts, Rep., transmitted by letter dated Aug. 8, 2008
from the Chairperson of the Grp. of Governmental Experts established pursuant to resolution
61/89 to examine the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally
binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and
transfer of conventional arms, addressed to the Secretary-General, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. A/63/334
(Aug. 26, 2008).
175
Stop Gun Trafficking and Strengthen Law Enforcement Act of 2011, H.R. 2554,
112th Cong. (2011).
176
Bill Summary and Status Search Results, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/bdquery/R?d112:FLD003:@1%28Rep.+Maloney+Carolyn%29 (last visited Apr. 18,
2013) [hereinafter Bill Summary and Status].
177
Id.
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criminal code currently in force. Instead, it adds a new section to the
criminal code that would make it illegal “to receive, or to transfer or
otherwise dispose of to 1 or more individuals, 2 or more firearms . . .
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such conduct will result
in the disposing of 1 or more such firearms to an individual” whose
possession of the weapon is unlawful or who intends to use or dispose of
the weapon unlawfully. 178 The law would also explicitly criminalize
involvement in a conspiracy to traffic firearms. 179
Finally, the new legislation would impose significant penalties for
trafficking in firearms by altering 18 U.S.C. § 924. A maximum sentence
of twenty years’ imprisonment would be imposed on those who traffic
firearms as defined by the newly created 18 U.S.C. § 932(a) and (b). 180 The
sentence would be increased to a maximum of twenty-five years for
defendants acting in a management or supervisory role in an organization of
five or more persons. 181 Conspiring to violate the new law would also
result in a maximum penalty of ten years’ imprisonment.182
B. AN ANALYSIS OF THE WEAPONS-TRAFFICKING STATUTE—IS IT
ENOUGH?

The proposed legislation is a significant step toward giving law
enforcement the necessary tools to combat weapons trafficking. It does not
alter any current provisions of federal law, however, and instead merely
criminalizes additional conduct. As a result, only some of the problems in
the present statutory regime are solved by the new legislation.
The most important aspect of the new legislation is that it officially
criminalizes weapons trafficking by adding 18 U.S.C. § 932 to the criminal
code. Instead of being charged with a mere paper violation for lying on a
federal form, those who are involved in trafficking weapons can be charged
with a crime that has an inherent severity equal to the underlying acts. 183
The additional weight given to these substantive violations could ensure
that prosecuting offices and the public at large take the violations more
seriously. 184 It may also ensure that media coverage of these issues
becomes more proportionate to the seriousness of the problem. This statute
178

H.R. 2554 § 2(a).
Id.
180
Id. § 2(b).
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
See supra Part II.B.
184
During congressional testimony about the current lying and buying statutes, one ATF
agent said that “[s]ome people view this as no more consequential than doing 65 in a 55.”
OUTGUNNED, supra note 39, at 9.
179
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thus gives law enforcement what they have been requesting for some time:
“There is no gun-trafficking statute,” said James Cavanaugh, a retired ATF
supervisor. “We’ve been yelling for years that we need a gun-trafficking
statute, because these cases are so difficult to prove.”185
Second, the new legislation provides much higher maximum penalties
for those who violate the statute than can be levied under current law. The
maximum penalties for violating the proposed weapons-trafficking statute
are more than double the penalties currently used by law enforcement to
combat trafficking. 186 Under the current regime, a person who purchased a
weapon with the intention of selling or otherwise transporting it to a drug
cartel could be convicted of lying and buying and face a maximum sentence
of either five or ten years, but probably would receive something much
lower. 187 Under the new weapons-trafficking statute, the same defendant
could be convicted of trafficking so long as he purchased two or more
firearms and could face a maximum sentence of twenty years, or up to
twenty-five years if he was an organizer of the group. 188
Additionally, the new weapons-trafficking statute adds some flexibility
to the charging of conduct related to weapons offenses. A person charged
with weapons trafficking under the new statute has room to negotiate with
prosecutors or law enforcement for a lower charge, such as a violation of
the lying and buying provisions. This room for charge bargaining could
give law enforcement more leverage when attempting to convince offenders
to provide information on others in the trafficking organizations. The
longer sentence also provides motivation for offenders to give information.
A person facing probation is much less likely to cooperate with law
enforcement and risk retribution from the cartel than is a person facing
twenty-five years’ imprisonment. If law enforcement has this additional
ability to negotiate, it could result in more information about the trafficking
organizations without the danger of following guns across the U.S.–Mexico
border or waiting for the weapons to turn up at a crime scene.
Finally, the new weapons-trafficking statute appears to give law
enforcement the ability to pursue criminals operating in Mexico, equivalent
to the Department of Justice’s pursuit of Mexican drug kingpins. Federal
drug-trafficking statutes criminalize the importation of illegal drugs into the
United States and, in so doing, criminalize actions that occur wholly outside
of the United States, so long as prosecutors demonstrate a nexus to the

185
186
187
188

Grimaldi, supra note 147, at A4.
See H.R. 2554 § 2(b); supra Part II.B.
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), 924(a)(1)(A) (2006).
See H.R. 2554 § 2(b).
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United States. 189 Under these statutes, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices have
charged Mexican drug traffickers in the United States 190 and either arrested
them in the United States or extradited them from Mexico to face trial in a
United States court. 191 Strong, coordinated actions by the United States
Department of Justice have played a significant role in dismantling
narcotrafficking organizations that once controlled significant supply lines
into the United States. 192
Criminalizing weapons trafficking appears, on its face, to create the
same possibility, because it would be illegal “to receive . . . 2 or more
firearms . . . knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such
conduct will result in the disposing of 1 or more such firearms to an
individual” whose possession of the weapon is unlawful or who intends to
use or dispose of the weapon unlawfully. 193 Members of Mexican drug
cartels, the ultimate recipients of the weapons, would seem to fall under this
statute and could thus be charged and prosecuted by U.S. law enforcement.
Problems remain with the way the new statute would work in practice.
The new legislation first creates an interesting issue as to how to define
“unlawful.” 194 For example, if the gun is transported to Mexico, is the mere
fact that it passes into the hands of non-U.S. citizens, in contravention of
189

See 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (2006) (making it “unlawful to . . . import into the United
States from any place outside thereof, any controlled substance in schedule I or II” or certain
other controlled substances); see also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (containing federal conspiracy statute
making it unlawful for “two or more persons [to] conspire . . . to commit any offense against
the United States . . . and one or more of such persons [to] do any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy”).
190
See, e.g., Richard Marosi & Tracy Wilkinson, Mexico Is Under Seige: Drug Kingpin
Is Sent to U.S., L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2001, at A1 (describing the extradition of the former
boss of the Tijuana cartel to face federal charges in San Diego); Kristina Sherry, U.S. Indicts
Reputed Mexican Drug Dealers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009, at A24 (explaining major
federal indictments in Chicago and Brooklyn for leaders of the Sinaloa and Juarez cartels).
191
Extradition between the United States and Mexico is governed by treaty and, while
differences between the legal systems and foreign policy considerations complicate the
process, the United States has been incredibly successful at extraditing fugitives to face
justice in U.S. courts. Once a fugitive is before a U.S. judge on a valid indictment, the
criminal process does not differ whether the fugitive was extradited or merely arrested in the
United States. Some issues may arise, however, that are related solely to extradition cases.
See, e.g., Roberto Iraola, The Doctrine of Specialty and Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 43
VAL. U. L. REV. 89 (2008).
192
See Mariano Castillo & Catherine E. Shoichet, Former Mexican Kingpin Pleads
Guilty, CNN.COM (Jan. 4, 2012, 7:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/04/justice/drugtrafficker-plea/index.html (noting the recent guilty plea of the former leader of the once
fearsome Tijuana cartel).
193
H.R. 2554 § 2(a).
194
The legislation does include some explanation as to what it intends by an “individual
whose possession or receipt of the firearm would be unlawful,” referring to those who are
under indictment or who have been convicted of felonies or drug offenses. Id.
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U.S. law, sufficient to count as unlawful possession?195 Similarly, does the
fact that possession of most of these weapons is illegal in Mexico mean that
the weapon trafficked to Mexico is transferred to someone who illegally
possesses it? 196 These questions are not answered in the legislation, but
could create interesting arguments as federal prosecutors attempt to charge
defendants under the proposed weapons-trafficking statute. It is unclear
precisely what a prosecutor would have to prove to gain a conviction under
this statute.
Moreover, any cartel leaders who conspire or plan the trafficking of
weapons could also face criminal prosecution for their involvement,
potentially facing very lengthy sentences for their leadership roles. 197 The
new statute thus gives law enforcement and prosecutors an additional way
to investigate and punish criminal conduct by those directing trafficking
organizations in Mexico.
C. CAN THE LAW PASS?

Even with the benefits of a new trafficking statute, the proposed bill is
unlikely to pass Congress. The main obstacle for passage is the strength of
the National Rifle Association. The NRA has already pledged to oppose
any bill that adds to the current cadre of weapons laws, stating that law
enforcement should focus instead on complete enforcement of the laws
already on the books. 198 Conservative politicians have also traditionally
considered gun control a crucial issue and have attempted to cast
themselves as the protectors of an absolute Second Amendment right.199
The NRA has been remarkably successful at getting its desired policies
enacted by Congress. In the last ten years, the NRA has prevented the
195
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(5)(A) (2006) (making it illegal for aliens illegally or
unlawfully in the United States to possess weapons).
196
See supra Part I.A.
197
H.R. 2554 § 2(b).
198
Christine Mai-Duc, Amid Fast and Furious Probe, Democrats Push New Gun Control
Bill, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/15/news/la-pn-guntrafficking-20110715 (“‘The laws are already on the books,’ said Andrew Arulanandam, a
spokesperson for the NRA, in an interview. ‘The problem is a lack of enforcement.’”).
199
See Allen Rostron, Cease Fire: A “Win-Win” Strategy on Gun Policy for the Obama
Administration, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 352 (2009) (demonstrating the way leading
Republican presidential candidates in 2007 attempted to use their opposition to gun control
as a way to prove their conservative bona fides). Notably, in light of the tragedy at Sandy
Hook Elementary, Republican opposition to gun regulations has become less monolithic.
Rachel Weiner, Incoming GOP Congressman Open to Gun Control, WASH. POST (Dec. 28,
2012, 10:25 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2012/12/28/
incoming-gop-congressman-open-to-gun-control/ (describing one Republican lawmaker who
was endorsed by the NRA and some other colleagues as open to “new assault weapon
restrictions”).
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reenactment of the federal ban on assault weapons, successfully lobbied
Congress to give the gun industry special immunity from tort liability, and
managed to pass federal and state laws prohibiting the seizure of private
weapons during times of emergency in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. 200
Opponents of restrictions on gun ownership earned a huge victory in
the 2008 Supreme Court decision of District of Columbia v. Heller. 201 The
case involved a challenge to the District of Columbia’s law prohibiting the
possession of a handgun without a license issued by the chief of police. 202
In overturning the statute, the Court held that the Second Amendment
conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms, although the right is
Instead, the right is maintained “in case of
“not unlimited.” 203
confrontation,” or for the purpose of individual self-defense. 204 In so
ruling, the court fueled the arguments of those who oppose meaningful
regulations on individual gun ownership. 205 In fact, in arguing against
reinstituting the assault-weapons ban and other meaningful antitrafficking
statutes, the NRA has framed the argument in terms of a right to defend
oneself with the use of those weapons. 206
The House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary is currently
comprised of twenty-three Republicans and eighteen Democrats.207 The
bill is cosponsored by thirty Democrats and zero Republicans,
demonstrating where support and opposition are likely to fall.208
Republicans have also shown the direction in which they are likely to vote
during the Fast and Furious congressional investigation. During the
investigation, Republican Chair Darrell Issa (CA) repeatedly blocked
questions on the deficiencies in the statutory regime and potential
modifications that would help law enforcement, insisting that these were
200

Rostron, supra note 199, at 351.
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
202
Id. at 574–75.
203
Id. at 595.
204
Id. at 592.
205
But see id. at 626–27 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons . . . or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”).
206
See Jason Ryan, Obama to Seek New Assault Weapon Ban, ABC NEWS (Feb. 25,
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=6960824&page=1#.TxryqW9STwA (“‘A
semi-automatic is a quintessential self-defense firearm owned by American citizens in this
country,’ [the head of the NRA] said. ‘I think it is clearly covered under Heller and it’s
clearly, I think, protected by the Constitution.’”).
207
See Committee Members, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, http://judiciary.house.gov/about/members.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
208
Bill Summary and Status, supra note 176.
201
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outside of the scope of the congressional investigation. 209 Issa insisted that
the hearing was not called “to talk about proposed gun legislation.” 210
Yet even though any issue related to gun control raises “bitterly
controversial political and cultural issues,” 211 some believe that there is
room for compromise and across-the-aisle agreement. For example, the
NRA has stated that it distinctly opposes international trafficking of
firearms. 212 The NRA also has advocated since the Clinton era for a very
strict enforcement of current weapons laws in order to best protect the
Second Amendment right to bear arms that they vociferously defend.213
The disagreement hinges largely on the scope of the trafficking problem
and the best way to solve it. 214 There should be room for debate and room
for compromise. The bottom line is that the issue should be approached
with a view toward how to best solve the problem of international weapons
trafficking that occurs daily along the U.S. border with Mexico, while
maintaining the rights espoused in the United States Constitution.
D. REQUIREMENTS FOR CRAFTING A BETTER STATUTORY REGIME

The solution to the problem of international weapons trafficking along
the border with Mexico must be comprehensive and involve a rearranging
of current federal law. The new system must have a distinct focus on
international trafficking. The current laws, promulgated in 1968 (the Gun
Control Act) and in 1994 (the Brady Act), contemplate the problem of
single purchasers gaining access to weapons and then using them to harm
innocent civilians. 215 They do not contemplate full-scale organizations
purchasing and funneling weapons for crime bosses. The new system must
also be comprehensive in order to take into account the varied range of
persons involved in weapons trafficking, from straw purchasers to
middlemen to cartel bosses. While the history of weapons laws in the
209

Christine Mai-Duc, Democrats Seek to Curb Gun Trafficking, L.A. TIMES, July 1,
2011, at A9.
210
See OUTGUNNED, supra note 39, at 7.
211
Rostron, supra note 199, at 348.
212
Gun Trafficking to Mexico: Already Against the Law, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N-INST. FOR
LEGISLATIVE ACTION (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/fact-sheets/2009/
gun-trafficking-to-mexico%C2%A0already-agai.aspx?s=InternationalGunControlIssues&st=
&ps=.
213
Rostron, supra note 199, at 358.
214
Wayne LaPierre, the head of the NRA, asserts that there is sufficient evidence to
conclude that the majority of weapons used in Mexico actually come from Russia and
Central American countries such as Guatemala. Perez, supra note 19, at C1.
215
See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–928 (2006)); Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No.
103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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United States has largely centered around solving a single, targeted
problem, the new regime must encompass a broader, more complicated
danger and should therefore be just as nuanced as the problem. Any new
laws must first address the specific problem of international trafficking and,
second, address the problem in a comprehensive manner by lowering the
knowledge requirement to convict straw purchasers, increasing the penalties
for trafficking violations, and helping ATF to track weapons sales to
identify potential traffickers.
1. Focus on International Trafficking
Any new set of statutes must specifically focus on the problem of
international weapons trafficking. 216 Up to this point, weapons laws passed
in the United States have focused not on international trafficking but on
preventing certain classes of individuals from obtaining weapons. The
main structure of the current regulatory scheme was created with the
passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968. The stated purpose of the Gun
Control Act of 1968 was to “assist State and local governments in reducing
the incidence of crime.” 217 The support was granted by provisions of the
Act that banned certain individuals from possessing weapons 218 and forced
sellers of weapons to register and obtain federal firearm licenses. 219 As
discussed above, however, the Act does not criminalize trafficking and
never contemplated this problem when it was enacted.220
A second major enactment added to the current regulatory scheme, but
again did not focus on trafficking. The Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act of 1994, much like the Gun Control Act of 1968, sought to
give law enforcement the tools to prevent certain individuals from obtaining
weapons, specifically handguns. The stated purpose of this Act was to
“provide for a waiting period before the purchase of a handgun, and for the
establishment of a national instant criminal background check system to be
contacted by firearms dealers before the transfer of any firearm.” 221 This
was accomplished by requiring background checks for individuals
purchasing firearms from an FFL. 222 While this is helpful in the fight
216

Trafficking is the movement of weapons into an illegal, unregulated market, which is
distinct from smuggling or simple illegal purchases. See supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
217
H.R. REP. NO. 488, at 1 (1967).
218
18 U.S.C. § 922.
219
Id. § 923.
220
See id. §§ 921–928.
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Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, pmbl., 107 Stat.
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§ 102, 107 Stat. at 1536–41.
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against trafficking because law enforcement can detect suspicious patterns
of behavior, the background check will only prevent sales to those
suspected classes established by the Gun Control Act of 1968. It therefore
reinforces the scheme established in 1968 but does not alter the purpose of
the legislation. Attempting to eliminate trafficking using a scheme that
never contemplated the problem is clearly inefficient. The laws should
instead be updated to solve the current problem.
2. Comprehensive Changes
In addition to being focused on trafficking, the new laws must be
comprehensive in scope. The law cannot simply be a temporary fix to one
part of the problem—it should address all stages and potential aspects of
weapons trafficking. This approach is contrary to the history of federal
weapons laws, which have often been shortsighted and ineffective. 223 This
can be blamed at least in part on Congress’s tendency to pass narrow laws
as a reflexive response to a significant national tragedy. 224 The result has
created an “often incoherent patchwork of provisions . . . [as] [l]egislators
pile new restrictions atop old ones, often in response to particular tragedies
or narrow concerns.” 225 Any reforms must not be merely a reflexive
response to the Fast and Furious scandal—they should create a statutory
regime that gives law enforcement the tools to prevent weapons trafficking
at every possible stage. 226
The first step should be to pass H.R. 2554. The new law will officially
criminalize weapons trafficking and provide stiff penalties for those who
violate the law. The new law also provides some flexibility for law
enforcement and prosecutors who would have the discretion to charge an
individual with trafficking or a more minor violation of lying and buying
statutes that carry a lower penalty. Finally, the new weapons-trafficking
statute could give law enforcement the ability to prosecute criminals
operating in Mexico. The new statute makes it illegal to conspire with
others to transfer firearms to those who intend to use the weapons
223
See Allen Rostron, Incrementalism, Comprehensive Rationality, and the Future of
Gun Control, 67 MD. L. REV. 511, 561–62 (2008).
224
Id. at 562 (explaining that the National Firearms Act of 1934 was passed shortly after
a failed attempt to assassinate President-elect Franklin Roosevelt amid “widespread fear of
gangsterism, fueled by sensational media reports”; the Gun Control Act of 1968 was passed
in response to the assassinations of Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. and Senator Robert
Kennedy; and the Columbine shootings spurred efforts to expand background checks).
225
Id. at 512.
226
Given the way that Republican lawmakers have deflected attention away from
inadequacies in the current laws in favor of a vociferous attack on Department of Justice
personnel, it appears that the tragedy of Agent Terry’s death is unlikely to result in serious
reform.
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unlawfully. 227 Thus, any part of the organization, operating in Mexico or
abroad, should potentially be criminally liable under the new statute.
But does the statute go far enough to give law enforcement the
necessary tools to stem the tide of weapons flowing south into Mexico?
Unfortunately, the statute maintains aspects of the original statutory regime
that prevents law enforcement from solving the problem. Most importantly,
the new trafficking statute maintains the very high mens rea that is codified
in the current weapons laws. The firearms-trafficking statute makes it
unlawful to “transfer or otherwise dispose of . . . 2 or more firearms . . .
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe” that their acts will result in
possession of the firearms by someone whose possession is unlawful or
who “intends to or will use, carry, possess, or dispose of the firearm
unlawfully.” 228 The mental state required for the action to be criminal
remains “knowing or having reasonable cause to believe.” 229
This is the same as the current requirement that a person may not
“knowingly . . . make any false or fictitious oral or written statement with
respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale” or “knowingly
make[] any false statement or representation with respect to the information
required . . . to be kept in the records of a person licensed” to sell
firearms. 230 Although the statute also includes the phrase “reasonable cause
to believe,” this will be masked by the knowing requirement. Because it
does not make logical sense to punish “knowing” violations the same as
violations with a lower mens rea, courts might focus entirely on the
“knowing” standard. Given the difficulties that prosecutors face in proving
knowing violations of the current law, the problems are likely to remain
with passage of a trafficking statute that maintains the same high standard
of mens rea.
In fact, it may even be more difficult to prove a knowing trafficking
violation. Under the current weapons laws, prosecutors must show that the
individual knowingly made a false statement. For trafficking purposes, the
most common violation is when the offender indicates that he is purchasing
the weapon for himself when in reality he is purchasing the weapon for
another party. Prosecutors can demonstrate that the buyer sold off the
weapon after a short amount of time or that he accepted money from
227

Stop Gun Trafficking and Strengthen Law Enforcement Act of 2011, H.R. 2554,
112th Cong. (2011).
228
Id. § 932(2) (emphasis added).
229
Id. The reasonable cause language parallels language in 18 U.S.C. § 922 pertaining to
restrictions on federal firearms licensees. For example, FFLs are prohibited from selling
“any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe
that such person” is legally restricted from owning a firearm. Id. § 922(d).
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Id. § 922(a)(6); id. § 924(a)(1)(A).
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another person in order to make the purchase.231 But how does a prosecutor
show that a trafficker knowingly transported a weapon to a person who
intended to use the weapon unlawfully? The law, as written, requires
prosecutors to show that the ultimate recipient of a weapon intended to use
the weapon illegally and that the trafficker knew or had reasonable cause to
believe that he had this intention. The legislation therefore may again leave
law enforcement in a position where they have to track weapons to Mexican
crime scenes or otherwise risk that the weapons fall into the hands of
criminals in order to show affirmatively that there is a knowing violation of
the trafficking statute. This places law enforcement in the same situation
that led to authorization of the Fast and Furious Operation. Given the
present difficulties that prosecutors have just showing a knowing false
statement by a purchaser, the standard is entirely too onerous to be effective
in stopping weapons trafficking.
In addition to the weapons statute, Congress should consider
criminalizing additional actions with lower standards of knowledge. For
example, Congress could add provisions that make it unlawful for any
person to receive, transfer, or otherwise dispose of two or more firearms
that recklessly or negligently result in the disposing of one or more such
firearms to an individual whose possession or receipt of the firearm would
be unlawful or who intends to use or possess the firearm unlawfully.
Reckless or negligent trafficking would carry lower maximum sentences
than knowledgeable weapons trafficking. While the statute as it is provides
prosecutors with some level of flexibility because they can choose between
prosecuting for trafficking or for lying and buying, criminalizing actions
with a lower mens rea standard creates an even greater amount of
flexibility. Making it easier for prosecutors to charge and win cases would
better allow law enforcement to combat weapons trafficking.
To give prosecutors additional discretion and law enforcement
additional leverage, Congress should consider codifying certain aspects of
the sentencing guidelines within the trafficking statute. As currently written
in the U.S. Code, the maximum sentence is the same for trafficking two
firearms as it is for two hundred firearms. Incorporating some aspects of
the sentencing guidelines—such as number of weapons trafficked—into the
criminal code could make the possibility for longer sentences more
uniform. This would also provide more fairness for trafficking defendants
because it would force prosecutors to prove additional elements, increasing
their burden at trial. Law enforcement could be willing to bear this added
burden since it could also increase the deterrent effect by making the
231
See James C. McKinley, Jr., Prosecutors Seek Appeal in Dismissal of Gun Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at A13.
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likelihood of higher sentences more generally known. Defendants would
not face the uncertainty of increased sentences based on judge-found facts;
instead, prosecutors would have to prove each of these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt. 232 These changes would allow law enforcement to trade
information for leniency with defendants.
Proponents of overcriminalization theory233 might argue that lowering
mens rea requirements and increasing penalties on weapons traffickers
would result in the criminalization of behavior that is not morally culpable.
This is not the case. Those who decry the increased criminalization of
conduct in the United States are concerned with imposing a criminal
punishment for behavior that is more regulatory in nature, i.e., behavior that
does not carry with it the same moral opprobrium that generally
accompanies criminal convictions for actions like rape and murder. 234 Such
a concern is not at issue here. The bill before Congress and the additional
measures suggested by this Comment would punish the distinct action of
purchasing weapons on behalf of organizations that intend to use the
weapons to inflict wide-scale harm on society. 235 While the individual
purchasers may not intend to harm others themselves, they are knowingly
or recklessly providing others with the means to sow destruction. 236 These
conscious actions are enough to elicit the community’s moral outrage,
making it appropriate to deem the behavior criminal.
Finally, the new legislation also does nothing to improve reporting of
firearms sales. Adjustments to reporting regulations could potentially
provide more information for law enforcement, allowing them to better
track FFLs who regularly sell weapons that are used in violent crimes.
Additional reporting requirements can also help law enforcement find
certain buyers who may purchase weapons in bulk on the open market with
the intention of moving the weapons into the secondary market. 237
232
See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 3006 (2011).
233
See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: New Approaches to a Growing
Problem, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 530 (2012) (explaining how “continuous
multiplication of laws creates problems”).
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See John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 653, 683 (2012) (explaining that a statute is “criminal if it exhibits a
retributive purpose, that is, if it authorizes the state to impose sanctions to express the
community’s blame or condemnation for the commission of an unlawful act”).
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See Stop Gun Trafficking and Strengthen Law Enforcement Act of 2011, H.R. 2554,
112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011) (punishing those who pass weapons to another “who intends to or
will use, carry, possess, or dispose of the firearm unlawfully”).
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However, a requirement promulgated in January 2011 by the Obama
administration, which took effect in July 2011, requires FFLs to alert
authorities when an individual purchases two or more .22-caliber rifles
within five days. 238 The new requirement applies to approximately 8,500
gun dealers operating in the border states of California, Arizona, New
Mexico, and Texas. 239 The new regulation has already been challenged by
the NRA as beyond the statutory scope of the ATF, even though records of
the collected information must be destroyed unless it results in an
investigation. 240 Moreover, the regulation is almost identical to a similar
provision, in place since 1968, that requires dealers to report persons who
purchase two handguns within a five-day period. 241 Congress could use this
opportunity to clarify that this new regulation is within ATF’s authority.
Congress could impose another regulatory requirement on gun
purchases by making background checks universal for all weapons
purchases. As it currently stands, weapons from a person’s private
collection can be sold without a federal firearm license and without any
background check. Accordingly, these sales do not require any kind of
recordkeeping under federal law. The resulting secondary market is almost
impossible for law enforcement to track and provides a large source of
weapons for traffickers. 242 Legislation requiring all firearms sellers to keep
records of sales and run background checks on purchasers would aid law
enforcement in gaining information about who is purchasing firearms.
V. CONCLUSION
The weapons laws in the United States are ineffective at combating
international weapons trafficking along the southwest border with Mexico.
The problems in the statutory regime led ATF and other factions of the
Department of Justice into a reprehensible decision to allow weapons to
“walk” across the border and into the hands of ruthless criminals. Yet, the
aftermath of this scandal cannot be spent focused only on punishing those
in power for lapses in judgment. Rather, given the violence in Mexico and
the effect it has on both Mexicans and Americans living along the border,
the time has come for an honest appraisal of our weapons laws. The only
possible conclusion, given information provided by those who work within
ask him why he bought them. But otherwise, I won’t know until they start showing up at
crime scenes . . . .” Murphy, supra note 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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242
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were purchased off the secondary market. THE BRADY CTR., supra note 12, at 11.
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these laws every day, is to comprehensively reform the system to take into
account the unique problems of international weapons trafficking.
Some solutions will be easier than others to implement. Creating a
statute that criminalizes weapons trafficking, and carries with it an
appropriate penalty, should not be controversial. Other solutions, like
reducing the requisite mens rea for some weapons offenses, might require
greater political will. But, the most important task is raising the specter of
the problem and having an honest, national discussion about how best to
balance crucial constitutional rights with the state’s obligation to keep its
citizens safe. Surely the United States Bill of Rights cannot be construed in
a way that fundamentally weakens the security of the American public.
Given the present political climate, this may require a Herculean effort, but
this is why we elect a Congress—to make these difficult decisions.
Congress owes it to the people to have a debate on the issue and come to a
conclusion in a way that takes into account the facts as they are.

